Yes and it’s great that China is now successful in narrowing the gap, but there’s an obvious historic materialist and dialectical line of critique against this argument: this would be in arguing, that the gap was not just despite the overall rapid development, but the development was in part only this rapid because of the gap. The Hukou system split the working class: Almost three hundred million people still earn less than half of that which the privileged part of the working class earns, often live in cities yet do not have the right to stable permanent residency and have less access to schools, universities, public housing, pensions and health insurance. That created a flexible and cheap labor pool, reduced the fiscal burden on cities, increased profits, capital growth and investment. These are all things that contribute immensely to growth. So rather than arguing that the development was not rapid enough, one could ask wether it really had to be this rapid, or if it was really necessary to do it this way. I don’t know, maybe the answer is that it was necessary, considering the threat from the empire.
Edit: I held back with these thoughts earlier in a thread with libs, since they would misunderstand it, but thought I’d share since we’re amongst ourselves now.
Ultimately it’s a lot more complicated than any of us would like to admit, and these are complicated problems that both need addressing and careful analysis. Any decision made comes with tradeoffs. The Hukou system is one of China’s larger existing problems from what I understand, and while the CPC is trying to address the urban/rural gap and has made good progress, there’s a long way to go still.
Yes, I agree and it’s important to remember, that every imperial core country is much worse in how stratified their working class is, with for example agriculture often relying completely on very cheap and highly exploited labor from (often illegal) immigrants (eg US) and work-migrants (eg in Germany).
You raise some interesting ideas however when looking at the system as a whole I don’t think they are entirely accurate.
To start I think it’s important to note the scale of change in the hukou system in recent times. Cities under 3 million population have essentially removed settlement barriers, and even megacities are piloting residence-based public service access. This is a substantial structural shift reflecting changed material conditions.
The hukou system was also I believe an unfortunate necessity when it was originally put in place. Go to Mumbai. Look at Dharavi. One point seven five square kilometers holding over a million people in informal settlements with no basic infrastructure. That is what happens when capital accumulates without a mechanism to regulate the pace of urban absorption (the original reason for implementation of the hukou system). The hukou system, however imperfect, prevented that outcome. The hukou system functioned as a valve. It allowed industrialization to proceed at a speed that absorbed labor without collapsing urban systems.
It’s also important to look at the positives of the system as it remains despite its many shortcomings. Every rural hukou holder retains rights to a homestead plot and contracted land. This is the material basis for China’s near-elimination of absolute homelessness. When a rural worker in a city faces unemployment or illness, there is a place to return to. This safety net reduced the fiscal burden on early-stage industrial capital, yes, but it also prevented the formation of a permanently dispossessed urban underclass.
Was rapid industrialization necessary. Absolutely. Not only because of the very real threat of encirclement and containment, which any materialist analysis must account for, but because poverty alleviation on the scale China achieved required a massive productive base. You cannot lift eight hundred million people out of poverty through redistribution of a feudal style economy alone. You need jobs, infrastructure, technology, and the fiscal capacity to fund public goods. That capacity was built through industrial accumulation. The rural industrialization phase, the township and village enterprises, the gradual absorption of migrant labor into manufacturing, these were not arbitrary choices. They were the only path that generated the surplus needed for the later stages of development.
Finally, the gap. It is terrible. But it’s important to measure the rise in the floor not just it’s gap to the ceiling. In 1978, nearly nine out of ten rural Chinese lived in extreme poverty. Today, that number is zero by the international standard. The roof rose faster creating a gap, yes. But the floor rose from subsistence to basic security, from illiteracy to nine years of compulsory education, from no access to healthcare to near-universal coverage. Uneven development is not a moral failure in the abstract. It is the concrete form development takes under historical constraints.
Yes and it’s great that China is now successful in narrowing the gap, but there’s an obvious historic materialist and dialectical line of critique against this argument: this would be in arguing, that the gap was not just despite the overall rapid development, but the development was in part only this rapid because of the gap. The Hukou system split the working class: Almost three hundred million people still earn less than half of that which the privileged part of the working class earns, often live in cities yet do not have the right to stable permanent residency and have less access to schools, universities, public housing, pensions and health insurance. That created a flexible and cheap labor pool, reduced the fiscal burden on cities, increased profits, capital growth and investment. These are all things that contribute immensely to growth. So rather than arguing that the development was not rapid enough, one could ask wether it really had to be this rapid, or if it was really necessary to do it this way. I don’t know, maybe the answer is that it was necessary, considering the threat from the empire.
Edit: I held back with these thoughts earlier in a thread with libs, since they would misunderstand it, but thought I’d share since we’re amongst ourselves now.
Ultimately it’s a lot more complicated than any of us would like to admit, and these are complicated problems that both need addressing and careful analysis. Any decision made comes with tradeoffs. The Hukou system is one of China’s larger existing problems from what I understand, and while the CPC is trying to address the urban/rural gap and has made good progress, there’s a long way to go still.
Yes, I agree and it’s important to remember, that every imperial core country is much worse in how stratified their working class is, with for example agriculture often relying completely on very cheap and highly exploited labor from (often illegal) immigrants (eg US) and work-migrants (eg in Germany).
You raise some interesting ideas however when looking at the system as a whole I don’t think they are entirely accurate.
To start I think it’s important to note the scale of change in the hukou system in recent times. Cities under 3 million population have essentially removed settlement barriers, and even megacities are piloting residence-based public service access. This is a substantial structural shift reflecting changed material conditions.
The hukou system was also I believe an unfortunate necessity when it was originally put in place. Go to Mumbai. Look at Dharavi. One point seven five square kilometers holding over a million people in informal settlements with no basic infrastructure. That is what happens when capital accumulates without a mechanism to regulate the pace of urban absorption (the original reason for implementation of the hukou system). The hukou system, however imperfect, prevented that outcome. The hukou system functioned as a valve. It allowed industrialization to proceed at a speed that absorbed labor without collapsing urban systems.
It’s also important to look at the positives of the system as it remains despite its many shortcomings. Every rural hukou holder retains rights to a homestead plot and contracted land. This is the material basis for China’s near-elimination of absolute homelessness. When a rural worker in a city faces unemployment or illness, there is a place to return to. This safety net reduced the fiscal burden on early-stage industrial capital, yes, but it also prevented the formation of a permanently dispossessed urban underclass.
Was rapid industrialization necessary. Absolutely. Not only because of the very real threat of encirclement and containment, which any materialist analysis must account for, but because poverty alleviation on the scale China achieved required a massive productive base. You cannot lift eight hundred million people out of poverty through redistribution of a feudal style economy alone. You need jobs, infrastructure, technology, and the fiscal capacity to fund public goods. That capacity was built through industrial accumulation. The rural industrialization phase, the township and village enterprises, the gradual absorption of migrant labor into manufacturing, these were not arbitrary choices. They were the only path that generated the surplus needed for the later stages of development.
Finally, the gap. It is terrible. But it’s important to measure the rise in the floor not just it’s gap to the ceiling. In 1978, nearly nine out of ten rural Chinese lived in extreme poverty. Today, that number is zero by the international standard. The roof rose faster creating a gap, yes. But the floor rose from subsistence to basic security, from illiteracy to nine years of compulsory education, from no access to healthcare to near-universal coverage. Uneven development is not a moral failure in the abstract. It is the concrete form development takes under historical constraints.
Thank you, this is very important context!