cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/52172473
Putin’s every move to preserve power accelerates decay, writes an anonymous former senior official in the Russian government in an op-ed for the Economist.
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Vladimir Putin has led Russia into a dead-end and nobody has a map for what comes next. The first manifestation is a shift in the language used by senior officials, regional governors and businessmen: they have stopped using the first-person plural when talking about the actions of authorities in the country.
As recently as last spring, everything was “we” and “ours”. Mr Putin’s war on Ukraine may be reckless and failing, but it was shared. “We” were inside it, and it would be better for all of “us” if it ended sooner. Now they describe what is happening as “his” story, not “ours”. Not our project, not our agenda, not our war.
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The authoritarian system can survive for a long time on fear, inertia and repression. It still has a monopoly on violence, but has lost its monopoly on shaping the future.
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The irony is that Mr Putin started the war to preserve power and the system he has created. Now, for the first time since the conflict began, Russians are starting to imagine a future without him.
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In the past three years assets worth around 5trn roubles ($60bn) have been seized from private businessmen and either nationalised or handed to loyalists and cronies, the largest redistribution of property since the mass privatisation of the 1990s. It is not that the elites have suddenly discovered a taste for the rule of law or democracy. But even those loyal to the regime crave rules and institutions that can resolve conflicts fairly.
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At the same time, Russia is suffering an identity crisis. For the first time in generations it lacks an external model to define itself against. Historically it defined itself in relation to Europe and the wider West. They were there to catch up with, to fall behind, to confront. That old axis is gone. The West as a single cultural, military and political entity is in crisis. There is no “there” against which one can define “here”. This is not an ideological issue. It is structural.
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All four factors create a situation which in chess is known as a Zugzwang: when every move worsens the position. The system can persist for as long as Mr Putin remains in power. But his every move to preserve and expand it accelerates decay. His instinctive response may be to intensify repression. He may start another war. But these actions would only make things worse. He cannot restore the connection between power and the future. He can only make the rupture bloodier and more dangerous.
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I think far worse; when Putin dies there will be chaos. He has created a mafia state, and keeps different factions in line by using fear and playing people against each other. When he goes, there isn’t a clear successor - there are just various rivals vying for power.
I think a Russian civil war is likely, in the form of essentially criminal factions within the state duking it out, rather than “the people” rising up. And scarily that means factions within the army, including regional power brokers with their own “private” armies like in Chechnya, the mercenary armies as well as the police / state security apparatus. Groups all armed to the teeth.
We saw a small preview with the Wagner Group rebellion in 2023. That petered out because Yevgeny Prigozhin was basically out of his depth, was tricked into peace with false promises, and then assassinated at the first opportunity. Other players aren’t as naive, and Putin won’t be there as a power broker once he’s dead.
I agree Putin may die a normal death, but the Ukraine war was actually a major misstep and it’s possible someone may move against him if it continues to drag on and damage the economy so much. All the players are constantly calculating are they better with Putin around or not; at the moment it’s still with Putin around but that is not guaranteed. Russia is a literal power keg, and we should all be very worried what happens next.