The U.K. Ministry of Defense is facing growing questions about the progress of its F-35 program, after key shortcomings were outlined in a recent critical report from the Public Accounts Committee, a body that examines the value for money of government projects. As well as the adverse effect on the program of years of cost-cutting, the F-35B still critically lacks a standoff strike capability. In particular, the committee found that a shortage of maintenance engineers is having a profound effect on F-35B availability and output. During Parliamentary questions in the House of Commons, Ben Obese-Jecty, a Conservative member of parliament, asked the Ministry of Defense how long it would take to fix these issues. In response, Luke Pollard, minister of state at the Ministry of Defense, said that the maintenance engineer shortages would not be fixed for three to four years, although steps had been taken in this direction, including a “significant” increase in the recruitment of engineers over the last two years. These efforts have included boosting training capacity as well as sign-on bonuses for new recruits. According to the Public Accounts Committee report, The U.K.’s F-35 capability, the shortage of qualified engineers in the Royal Air Force (RAF) came about due to a failure to determine exactly how many of these critical staff would be needed. As a result, this is now one of the main reasons behind the F-35’s availability being judged “poor” and the jet consistently failing to meet targets.

“The Ministry of Defense has introduced a program of surging recruitment for the RAF so that it returns to workforce balance across every specialization,” Pollard explained. “This activity includes a significant focus on the engineer profession where, over the last two years, the RAF has offered joining bonuses and increased the capacity of technical training schools to enable more recruits to be trained. To improve retention, the RAF has implemented a Financial Retention Incentive for engineers. The recruitment and retention of personnel remains one of the top two priorities for the chief of the defense staff.” While it’s true that the U.K. Armed Forces, in general, are suffering from a lack of technical support staff, it remains embarrassing that, in the case of the F-35B, the Ministry of Defense simply “miscalculated how many engineers would be needed per plane,” by failing to take into account staff taking leave and performing other tasks. Overall, the Public Accounts Committee judges the F-35 “the best fast jet the United Kingdom has ever had.” The jet is currently operated by two frontline units, the RAF’s No. 617 Squadron, the “Dambusters,” and the Royal Navy’s 809 Naval Air Squadron (NAS), as well as a training unit, No. 207 Squadron, RAF, which serves as the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU). All of these are home-based at RAF Marham in England, the main operating hub when the jets are not embarked in one of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers or deployed on operations. As of this summer, 38 F-35Bs had been delivered, with one of these lost in a carrier accident in the Mediterranean.

The report found that a history of “cost-cutting” throughout the U.K. F-35 program “has caused significant problems in its use,” which have affected the jet’s “capability, availability to fly, and value for money.” While these issues relate to the in-service F-35B, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the jet, the same report also warns that the plan to introduce the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A version, which is nuclear-capable, is also likely to run into problems relating to costs and timelines. When it comes to RAF Marham, the Public Accounts Committee slams the airbase for its “substandard accommodation,” which it described as “shabby, sometimes lacking hot water, and lacking bus access to a local town.” The report notes that work on infrastructure at Marham won’t be finished until 2034, a “very complacent date,” and one that could further exacerbate problems in personnel retention.

Turning to the aircraft itself, one of the most significant problems caused by the cost-cutting relates to the facility that is required to assess the F-35’s stealth capability. This is critical to ensure that the fighter’s low-observable characteristics are functioning as they should. After all, the jet’s stealth features are key to its evading high-end air defense systems. More broadly, it should be noted that this type of infrastructure is a core requirement of the F-35’s unique capabilities, and constructing and sustaining it comes at an added cost. To reduce the spending on the program, the Ministry of Defense delayed the investment in the facility, which provided a savings of £82 million (around $107 million) by 2024-25. However, due to inflation, the final cost of completing the facility will add another £16 million (around $21 million) on top of that by 2031-32. In another effort to save cash in the short term, in 2020, the Ministry of Defense chose to slow down the delivery schedule of the F-35Bs, which had the effect of reducing the number of jets available on the flight lines today. The situation was then compounded by a lack of funds for buying new aircraft in 2020; this meant that seven aircraft were delivered a year late. Finally, the Ministry of Defense took the decision to delay the full establishment of the first Royal Navy F-35B squadron, 809 NAS, again on budgetary grounds. This means the squadron has to wait until 2029 to get its full infrastructure at Marham. As a result, capability has been reduced and, once again, the eventual spend will be even greater: from £56 million (around $73 million) to a likely £154 million (around $201 million). With this history of financial mismanagement in the program, the Public Accounts Committee is skeptical about how the Ministry of Defense will manage the introduction of another version of the jet, the F-35A.

After years of speculation, the United Kingdom finally announced this summer that it will buy 12 F-35As. As we have discussed in the past, this jet offers a number of advantages over the F-35B, but the Ministry of Defense has specifically highlighted its ability to join the NATO nuclear mission, which would see the jets armed with U.S.-owned B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. On top of this mission, the RAF says that the new jets will be assigned to the training unit and will primarily be used in that role. According to the Public Accounts Committee: “Becoming certified for the NATO nuclear mission will add new requirements to training, personnel, and possibly infrastructure, but discussions in this area are at an early stage, and no indication of forecast costs has been provided by the Ministry of Defense.” One of those costs could well relate to the secure underground weapons vaults that are required to store the nuclear bombs. Whether such vaults did exist at RAF Marham in the past, it’s unclear whether this infrastructure remains intact or what degree of work it might need to accommodate the B61-12s. Some reports suggest the vaults have been dismantled or even filled in completely. Making use of U.S.-operated vaults at nearby RAF Lakenheath could be another option.

When the F-35A decision was announced, TWZ also highlighted the potential disadvantages of a mixed fleet, especially with only a dozen of these versions, which represents very much a token force: “A fleet of just 12 jets adds another type with some different maintenance and infrastructure requirements, and a relatively low availability rate, at least historically. At the same time, the training that it offers is not 1:1 for the STOVL F-35B, and it is questionable whether it will save money in the long run. That would change, however, if the British were to buy A-models in bigger numbers.” The question of numbers is one that has surrounded the U.K. F-35 program for many years now. The Ministry of Defense has vehemently stuck to its plan to procure 138 F-35s over the lifetime of the program, although this has long been called into question. So far, firm orders have only been placed for 48 F-35Bs. The previous Conservative government confirmed it was negotiating to buy another 27 F-35Bs for delivery by 2033. However, this batch of 27 jets will now be divided between F-35As (12) and F-35Bs (15). At the very least, it seems the planned number of STOVL F-35Bs to be purchased will be reduced. This could lead to problems, since it is widely considered that significantly more than 48 F-35Bs are required to meet the ambition of 24 jets available for the baseline Carrier Strike mission, across both carriers. Considering training and other demands, a figure of 60-70 jets is generally thought to be reasonable. In the meantime, U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs have, on occasions, been relied upon to make up the required aircraft numbers during carrier cruises, although this wasn’t the case for the recent embarkation of 24 jets on HMS Prince of Wales.

“Four APCs are participating in the defense of the river bank: one of them crosses the bridge to the other bank - this is a reconnaissance crew,” quotes one of the Polish instructors, translator Vitaliy (name changed), who at the end of 2024 completed a rotation with the Ukrainian military in western Poland. “There is a confused silence in the classroom,” he continues. “More than half of the audience are marines who went through Krynki (an operation on the left bank of the Kherson region in 2023. - Ed.). In the end, one of them asks, what if the bridge is destroyed? The Polish instructor proudly replies: “Our APCs swim.” He did not understand at all that everything was controlled by enemy drones, which would leave nothing of those APCs that swim up to 10 km/h.” This dialogue between the instructor and the Marines is just part of the overall picture, which has everything – NATO, textbooks and charters, fancy barracks and experienced buglers, but lacks the key element of modern warfare – drones. “They continue to teach from ‘Grunwald’ textbooks,” another BBC interlocutor bitterly jokes, referring to the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, a victory in which Polish historians are still proud to this day. The BBC spoke with Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen and translators who accompanied them during their training in Poland, and also received comments from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Polish Ministry of Defense. So what does the situation really look like?

“Can we remove the mavics?”

Training in Poland takes place in several areas - including basic training, advanced training, coordination, and special training in the use of Western technology. The programs include tactics, topography, survival, tactical medical, fire and assault training, international humanitarian law, etc. They are conducted mainly by Polish instructors, but some courses are prepared jointly with trainers from other partner countries. The battalion commander of one of the assault brigades currently fighting in the Pokrovsky direction, a major with the call sign “Eighteen”, talks about the adjustment course that his battalion took in Poland in 2024. The vast majority of fighters had just arrived after the BZVP in Ukraine: out of more than 400 people, only a dozen had combat experience. Major “Eighteen” himself completed his military service in 2013-2014, received a military education, and since 2022 has been fighting as part of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade. In 2024, he received a newly formed battalion, which became part of another brigade.

At the beginning of training, recruits were offered to choose from several areas: they could train to be marksmen (infantry sniper, short- and medium-range shooter), engineers, UAV operators, and infantry fighting vehicle crews. The training was conducted by instructors from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. The Czechs were responsible for marksmen and engineers, the Poles trained the infantry fighting vehicle crews, and the Ukrainians taught tactics. “The program of the Poles and Czechs follows NATO standards, but I have seen the Ukrainian army in the Poles since the end of 2013,” he says and explains, ““Statutshchina”, security measures, an instructor walks over each soldier. They taught what our soldier will not actually see in battle.”

For example, the battalion commander says, tactical medicine training was based on the “golden hour” rule - a standard for evacuating the wounded within 60 minutes, which emerged after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Ukraine, this standard has become a painful irony, because it is impossible to compare the possibilities of evacuation from under the sights of dozens of drones with how it was carried out in the Middle East under US air superiority. Now the wounded have to wait for evacuation for more than one hour, and in some places even more than one day. “One of our servicemen was wounded at around 8 am - a serious one, in the groin area. He could have just bled to death. But thanks to the fact that we taught him medicine, he made it until the evening - his limb wasn’t even amputated. So I explained to them (the instructors. - Ed.) that they should tell the soldier not just how to apply a tourniquet and tighten it harder, but also about after what period of time, at what time of year, how much the tourniquet should be released,” says “Eighteen.”

uh… critical support to the NATO invasions of the Middle East, which have apparently completely mind-broken the whole of Western military leadership to the point where they have no idea what actual conflict looks like anymore? note that this is training taking place in 2024, two years into the war!

The Polish side was also supposed to train UAV operators, but in fact was only able to provide a platform for this, says the major. “Fortunately, we took 12-15 Mavics, and we had one experienced pilot,” he says. The most interested in drones was Czech instructor Jakub (name changed), a veteran of peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan. Together with him, “Eighteen” decided to conduct an exercise: Czech paratroopers were to storm Ukrainian military positions. The “mavics” were to help them defend themselves. “After their first assault actions, Yakub came up to me and said, ‘Hey, can we remove the Maviks?’” says the major. “What’s wrong, Yakub?” he asked in response. “But you just cover us up very quickly with your Mavics, and we can’t get to you, you detect us on the approach to your positions,” the Czech instructor replied. “I say, Jakub, unfortunately, we are preparing for war.”

Western militaries genuinely cannot conceptualize actually being the victims of any real weapon, whether bombing by planes, artillery, or drones, they just assume that they’ll get to walk right up to the enemy’s position and win

“This is a good playground. Safe”

“Kastet” is a UAV operator of one of the units currently fighting in the Kharkiv direction. He joined the ranks of the defense on the third day of the full-scale war - he joined the infantry when he was 21 years old. Since then, he has fought in the Kharkiv region, Zaporizhia, and participated in the defense of Bakhmut. “Kastet” arrived in Poland in early 2025 to improve his skills - he was supposed to earn the rank of sergeant in order to lead a platoon. “After the first week, I was already calling the commander, telling him to take me away from here. I said, I’ll get on the bus myself and come. It was very unusual,” the soldier recalls and explains that he did not agree with what the Polish instructors were teaching. “Knuckles” gives an example: in survival classes, they were shown how to navigate the terrain using paper maps - but in over 3.5 years of combat operations, he never had to do this, because all the maps are on the soldiers’ phones or tablets. Storming trenches and urban operations, according to “Kastet”, are also taught in accordance with the realities of wars 20 years ago.

“They want to fly in tanks and Humvees right under the trench. Well, we told them that it doesn’t work that way anymore. It’s not done that way now. You put on a “kikimora” (camouflage suit. - Ed.) or an anti-heat cloak to be as invisible as possible, and you go to the position on foot,” he says. The constant presence of drones in the sky has turned any movement into a deadly threat, and the front line into a so-called “kill zone,” which, according to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, already extends for at least 10 kilometers. Some military personnel even speak of a 20-kilometer strip that is being shot at by Russian UAVs. Because of this, the landing of infantrymen now takes place as far away from the positions as possible: individual fighters on the way to the dugouts may not be noticed by enemy drones - unlike heavy equipment or military “snatchers”, characteristic khaki-colored SUVs. “Kastet” believes that what the Polish instructors could teach was useful for the “staff” soldiers, who made up half of the group. The rest - soldiers with combat experience -, he said, trained the Poles themselves. “We showed them how to properly storm with a drone. And how much easier it is. They were shocked,” he says, adding that he even received a certificate from the instructors for this.

When asked if there was anything positive about training in Poland, “Kastet” thinks about it. In the end, he admits that he liked training on his own the most. The commander of the assault battalion “Eighteen” answers without hesitation: “This is a good playground. Safe.”

At the same time, in November 2025, Western media citing Rheinmetall reported that during Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger’s visit to Romania, agreements were reached on procurement of Lynx IFVs for the Romanian military including production localization. And in the concern’s public presentation about development plans until 2030, among everything, one of the slides indicated plans to supply 298 Lynx KF41 armored vehicles to Romania, and media also reported that according to Papperger, a contract with Romania had supposedly already been signed.

However, as Defense Romania writes, the Romanian government denies the statement about signing an agreement with Rheinmetall for Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, which were supposed to be purchased under the SAFE [Security Action for Europe] European credit project. They note as strange the fact that Papperger was the first to announce the contract, whereas this usually happens with participation of representatives of signatory states, not the manufacturer.

But at the same time, it’s noted that German Lynx IFVs still remain in the game and are one of the options that Romania may ultimately purchase. However, whether the Romanians will choose it is questionable, because there’s a nuance with production localization since a number of important components are already manufactured in different countries. It’s not excluded that Romania will ultimately receive an insignificant share of its own defense industry’s participation in production of these vehicles, which may not be excluded, will be limited to vehicle assembly. There are also concerns about likely cooperation with Hungary in the direction of technical maintenance. It’s emphasized that Lynx’s competitors could be ASCOD from General Dynamics, especially since production of their Piranha 5 armored personnel carriers has already been organized in Romania. As well as Redback from South Korean Hanwha Aerospace.